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ABSTRACT
In many societies there is an elite, a relatively small group
of powerful individuals that is well connected and highly
influential. Since the ancient days of Julius Caesar’s senate
of Rome to the recent days of celebrities on Twitter, the size
of the elite is a result of conflicting social forces competing
to increase or decrease it.
The main contribution of this paper is the answer to the
question how large the elite is at equilibrium. We take an ax-
iomatic approach to solve this: assuming that an elite exists
and it is influential, stable and either minimal or dense, we
prove that its size must be Θ(
√
m) (where m is the number
of edges in the network).
As an approximation for the elite, we then present an em-
pirical study on nine large real-world networks of the sub-
graph formed by the highest degree nodes, also known as
the rich-club. Our findings indicate that elite properties
such as disproportionate influence, stability and density of
Θ(
√
m)-rich-clubs are universal properties and should join
a growing list of common phenomena shared by social net-
works and complex systems such as“small world,” power law
degree distributions, high clustering, etc.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and behavioral sci-
ences
General Terms
Theory; Measurement; Human Factors
Keywords
Social Networks; Axioms; Elite; Rich Club; Density; Influ-
ence; Structure
1. INTRODUCTION
“How many scientists in your research area are in the
group that controls and influences the progress of the field?,”
“How many students are in the group that are responsible
for the class spirit?,” “How many representatives should a
political party have in its decision making body?” All these
questions are about the elite of a social network, namely
about the size of the subgroups that are, in some sense,
controlling the network. Can we have a rule of the thumb
to answer these questions raised for different networks? The
current paper studies the structure of the elite and provides
such a rule. But first, let us look at which other properties
of social networks have been studied so far.
Notable examples for the basic universal properties exhib-
ited by complex systems and social networks are short av-
erage path lengths (a.k.a. the “small world” phenomenon),
high clustering coefficients, heavy-tailed degree distributions
(i.e., scale-free networks), navigability, and more recently
also dynamic properties such as densification and a shrink-
ing diameter [40, 1, 26, 32]. Traditionally, when “new” uni-
versal network properties are found by empirical measure-
ments, a new random graph model has been proposed that
generates networks which exhibit these properties. There-
fore, the empirical findings led to the emergence of a variety
of random graph models for evolution of social networks.
And in turn, these evolutionary models have been used to
predict and better understand the basic mechanisms that
govern the behavior of social networks. Some of the most
popular random models are the Baraba´si-Albert Preferential
Attachment model [1], the Small-World model [40, 16], the
Copy model [20], Forest Fire model [26], and more recently
the Affiliation Networks model [22].
In the current work, we study another basic and important
phenomenon exhibited in the structure of (social) networks:
the existence of an elite in the network. In the Cambridge
Dictionary the elite is defined as:
“The richest, most powerful, best educated or best
trained group in a society.”
Other definitions (e.g., Wikipedia) emphasize in addition
that the elite group is “small” and “well-connected.”
The first question we try to answer about the elite, is
maybe the most basic one: “What is the size of the elite, if
it exists, in complex networks?” Moreover, is the elite size
a universal property of complex networks, similar to other
universal properties we mentioned earlier? In particular, we
investigate if the elite size can be expressed in relation to
the total network size or other properties of the network.
Instead of providing an evolutionary model, we take an ax-
iomatic approach to study these questions. The axiomatic
approach has been used successfully in many fields of sci-
ence, such as mathematics, physics, economy, sociology and
computer science. See [3, 8] for two examples in areas re-
lated to ours. Perhaps the most well-known examples of this
approach are Euclidean geometry and Newton’s laws of mo-
tion. In the early 20th century, the axiomatic approach was
used successfully, e.g., by von Neumann in quantum physics
and in utility theory (with Morgenstern), and later in econ-
omy as well (e.g., by Nash, Vickrey, Aumann and Shapley).
Employing an axiomatic approach instead of providing a
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model has two main advantages for studying social and com-
plex networks. While a basic random model provides us with
a mechanism that generates networks with properties simi-
lar to the ones observed empirically, a suitable set of axioms
attaches an “interpretation” or “semantics” to the observa-
tions. Thus, a mechanism alone does not necessarily advance
our understanding of the meaning of the phenomenon. In
contrast when we describe a phenomenon in networks with
a set of axioms, we can assess, to some degree, whether the
axioms are “believable” by how plausible their meaning is.
The second advantage is that once we agree on the axioms,
it becomes possible to draw conclusions using logical argu-
ments, for example, inferring asymptotic behavior, which is
not always clear from empirical finding (i.e., since it is hard
to determine the value of the constants involved). In our
case, the axioms we propose allow us to answer the question
of how large the elite is. As a consequence, the axiomatic
approach is, in some sense, stronger than providing a par-
ticular model, since, if you agree on the axioms and their
implications, every model should be consistent with them.
Furthermore, axioms can steer the search for new models in
addition to empirical evidence.
Returning to elites, we observe that the size of the elite is
determined by conflicting forces. Forces that try to increase
the elite size versus forces that try to reduce its size. As
a motivation for this tension and process we were inspired
by historical anecdotes. Ancient Roman history provides an
example for forces that aspire to increase the size of the Ro-
man elite, namely, the senate [13, 18]. When established
around 750 BC, the senate included representatives of the
first 100 families. When the population grew, it was ex-
tended, reaching 300 members in 509 BC, and then 600 sen-
ators in 80 BC. It was Julius Caesar who finally increased
the senate to around a thousand senators. Interestingly, this
number is about the square-root of the Rome population at
the time, one million. On the other hand, the French Rev-
olution 1789–1799, provides an example for a society that
reduced its elite size. During the Reign of Terror from 1793
to 1794 thousands of French elite members, the nobility,
were executed by the guillotine [11].
Going back to our days, in the first part of this paper we
make an effort to formalize some of these social forces as
axioms, and to derive the elite size at equilibrium. Follow-
ing the elite definitions mentioned earlier, our axioms try
to capture, in a formal graph-theoretic way, that the elite
is influential, stable and either of minimum-size or dense.
The most important contribution of this paper is that these
axioms imply an elite size of Θ(
√
m), where m is the num-
ber of edges in the network. Note, that in many networks
m is not known, but if we assume additionally that n (the
number of nodes in the network which is often easier to de-
termine than the number of edges) and m are of the same
order of magnitude, i.e., the network is sparse, then our rule
of thumb for the size of the elite is Θ(
√
n).
Intuitively, the best candidates for the elite group are
nodes with the highest degree in the network, also called the
rich-club [42]. These nodes are well-known to exist follow-
ing the scale-free nature of complex systems and the power-
law degree distribution that enforce such“superstars”; nodes
with degree well above the average degree (a.k.a. “hubs”and
“connectors”) [9]. Previous research on the rich-club phe-
nomenon already demonstrated the existence of some inter-
esting properties like the tendency of high degree nodes to be
well connected among each other [6, 29, 42]. The importance
of the rich-club with respect to the whole network was con-
sidered in [41] which shows that the rich-club connectivity
has a strong influence on the assortativity and transitivity
of a network. Based on these findings, the rich-club can be
seen as an approximation of the elite of a complex network
due its influence on the rest of the network. We refer to
Section 5 for a discussion of related notions.
In the second part of the paper we perform an systematic
empirical study on the structural properties of the k-rich-
club subgraph; the graph that is induced by the k highest
degree nodes. To this end, we analyze nine real-world com-
plex networks. Our results indicate that the elite size, as
well as others of its structural properties, are universal, as
the measured quantities are similar on all the networks un-
der scrutiny.
Summary of our Results
Elite Axioms and Size: We propose a set of axioms com-
prising the elite’s influence, stability, density and compact-
ness. From these axioms one can conclude that the size of
the elite is in the order of
√
m, where m is the number of
edges in the network.
In contrast, previous research on the most influential group
considered it to be a constant fraction of the network , for
example in the 80–20 rule of Pareto in economics [34] in at-
tacks to break networks [2], or in rich-club studies [42, 31].
The fact that the elite is of size Θ(
√
m), an order of magni-
tude less, can hence have very important consequences for
several domains, as discussed in more detail in Section 6.
Empirical Findings: We present measurements on nine
existing social networks and complex systems for a vari-
ety of parameters for rich-clubs of growing size, providing
empirical evidence that for a
√
m-rich-club, the following
statements hold for its structure and its interaction with
the whole network1.
Inner Structure: (i) The induced subgraph of the
√
m-
rich-club of existing social networks is dense, in particular
much denser than the whole network. (ii) The largest con-
nected component of this subgraph contains all but a hand-
ful (<33) of the rich-club nodes. (iii) The average degree
of the
√
m-rich-club in its induced subgraph is significantly
higher than the average degree of the whole networks. Note
that these findings are not a mere consequence of the fact
that the rich-club contains the highest degree nodes (cf. to
networks with the same number of edges generated accord-
ing to some complex network models discussed later).
Influence: The elite has a “disproportionate” power to-
wards the society. In graph terms, a significant constant
fraction of nodes outside the
√
m-rich-club have a neighbor
in the
√
m-rich-club. Related to this is the fact that the
size of the cut between the
√
m-rich-club and the rest of the
network is a significant constant fraction of all edges in the
network.
Stability : The elite is stable against “outside” pressure
1Our findings on the density and influence reinforce, on ad-
ditional real-world networks, some of the claims of previ-
ous rich-club studies. Our other findings reveal unknown
features on the rich-club. In this paper we study the pre-
viously known and unknown properties together since they
were never considered before in the context of a
√
m-elite
size.
from the society, i.e., there is a balance between the exposure
to opinions inside and outside the elite. In graph terms, the
ratio between the number of edges from the
√
m-rich-club
to the remaining nodes (“outside” pressure) and the number
of internal edges (“inside” pressure) of the
√
m-rich-club is
constant.
Symmetry : In directed networks the
√
m-rich-club is sig-
nificantly more symmetric than the whole network.
Some of the above properties might have been known on
an anecdotal level or may seem obvious; however, they have
not been measured together for growing rich-clubs and they
cannot be explained by only considering the fact that the
k-rich-club contains the highest degree nodes. It does not
hold for arbitrary networks that the structure of the k-rich-
club has these properties. In order to demonstrate this, we
compare our findings on real-world data to the properties
the popular Erdo¨s-Renyi model, the Baraba´si-Albert model
and the Affiliation networks model exhibit.
In the next section we introduce the notions, data sets and
models used in this paper, followed by a set of axioms and
the derivation of the elite’s size in Section 3. After presenting
our measurement results in more detail in Section 4 and
reviewing related work in Section 5, we discuss our findings
and some major open questions raised by them in Section 6.
2. DATASETS AND MODELS
Today several popular online social networking sites like
Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube, Orkut, and LiveJour-
nal exist. These networking sites are based on an explicit
user graph to organize, locate, and share content as well as
contacts. In many of these sites, links between users are
public and can be crawled automatically. This allows re-
searchers to capture and study a large fraction of the user
graph. The obtained data sets present an ideal opportunity
to measure and study online social networks at a large scale.
Mislove et al. [31, 30, 37] have collected data from the most
prominent online social networks and made them available
to the research community. We used their data on Facebook,
Livejournal, Orkut, Flickr and YouTube in addition to data
provided by the Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection
(http://snap.stanford.edu/data/) on Autonomous Systems
(AS) and Wikipedia link graphs. Furthermore, we studied
the rich-club of Twitter [21] and a citation network (who
cites whom) derived from DBLP and the ACM digital li-
brary.
To find out if the rich-club of real life complex networks is
structurally different from arbitrary networks and to exam-
ine the rich-club of some well known graph models, we gener-
ated some graphs according to the the Erdo¨s-Renyi random
graph model, the Barabasi-Albert model and the Affiliation
model. One of the first and most simple models for net-
works is the Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) random graph model [7]. In
this model an edge between each pair of nodes exists with
equal probability p, independently of the other edges. One
model to generate scale-free graphs exhibiting some prop-
erties found in real networks is the Baraba´si-Albert (BA)
model [1]. It captures growth and preferential attachment.
More precisely it models the evolution of a social network,
where nodes join the network and build links to existing
nodes, based on their degree. The higher the degree of a
node, the more likely it is to attract new nodes to connect
to it. The network starts as an initial network of m0 nodes.
New nodes are added to the network one at a time. Each
∑
v∈E
di(v)
∑
v∈E
do(v)
E
Figure 1: Graphical demonstration of the elite and
parameters in the Axioms. m is the total number of
edges in the graph, E is the elite set (colored nodes),∑
v∈E do(v) is the total number of out-going edges
from the elite and
∑
v∈E di(v) is the total number of
edges within the elite.
new node is connected to m′ ≤ m0 existing nodes with a
probability that is proportional to the number of neighbors
that the existing nodes already have. Formally, the prob-
ability pi that the new node is connected to node i is [1]
pi = deg(i)/
∑
j deg(j), where deg(i) is the degree of node
i. In this work we adopt the convention m0 = m
′ and start
with an initial network forming a complete graph (clique).
Another model, based on a bipartite affiliation graph from
which a social network is derived, was presented in [22].
The affiliation graph models the fact that people (“actors”)
are typically connected to other people via “societies” (e.g.,
schools we visited, streets we live in, companies we work for,
etc.). The social network is obtained by folding the bipartite
graph, i.e., by generating an (undirected) edge in the social
network for paths of length two in the affiliation graph. The
affiliation graph evolves by letting new actors and societies
copy another node’s neighbors with some probability in ad-
dition to preferential attachment edges based on the degree.
For each of these models we produced graphs with 1 million
nodes. The parameters we used were p = 0.00002 for the
ER model, m′ = 10 for the BA model, and cq = cu = 2
(the number of edges added in 1 evolution step), s = 2
(the number of edges added by preferential attachment) and
β = 0.5 (how often the left/right side of the bipartite graph
grows). We decided to use these models as most other mod-
els known to us are based on variations and combinations
of these models. All data sets (with degree rank as node
identifiers) that we used in this paper are publicly available
by emailing avin@cse.bgu.ac.il.
3. ELITE SIZE - AXIOMATIC APPROACH
In this section we address one of the basic and most in-
triguing questions about the elite: what is its size? Many
definitions of the elite indicate that the elite is a small group
compared to the whole population. But what is the “right”
size? What is small?
To answer these questions, and to explain our empirical
results we take an axiomatic approach: we assume that an
elite features some basic properties in order to maintain its
power in the society and based on these we infer its size. We
claim that the elite must be socially stable and influential.
By adding either a density or min-size property, we conclude
that the elite size is in the order of Θ(
√
m), where m is
the total number of edges. When the number of edges is
proportional to the number of nodes n, then the elite size
turns out to be Θ(
√
n).2
More formally, let the set E ⊂ V denote the elite consisting
of |E| nodes. For a node v ∈ E let di(v) denote the internal
degree of v within E , i.e., how many neighbors of v belong to
the set E ; analogously do(v) denotes the number of neighbors
of v that are outside of the set E , i.e., in V \E . An illustration
of these notions can be found in Fig. 1. Let c1, c2, c3 be some
constants. We postulate the following axioms for the elite
set E .
1. Influence. The number of out-going edges from the
elite is a constant fraction of the total number of edges
in the network. ∑
v∈E
do(v) ≥ c1 ·m (1)
for 0 < c1 < 1.
Motivation: This axiom captures the power and influ-
ence that are associated with the elites. In complex
networks an edge can be interpreted as a source of
influence, thus a powerful group must control a large
fraction of edges in the network.
2. Stability. The number of edges within the elite is
proportional to the number of out-going edges from
the elite. ∑
v∈E
di(v) ≥ c2 ·
∑
v∈E
do(v), (2)
for 0 < c2 < 1.
Motivation: In order to adhere to its opinion, the elite
must be able to resist “outside” pressure; otherwise in-
dividuals in the elite will change their option and will
be influenced instead of being influential. Consider a
node v ∈ E that makes decision based on a weighted
majority of her friends. Since people in the elite are,
by definition, more powerful (e.g., rich, educated, etc.),
elite members’ opinions count for more when v con-
sults it neighborhood. If we weigh friends within the
elite with a power of 1, then the weight of the outside
friends w will be less than 1. c2 represents the (aver-
age) power we associate with friends outside the elite
in a stable case. Therefore, we expect that c2 < 1 in
real networks.
3. Minimum-Size/Compactness. The number of elite
members tends to be as small as possible.
Motivation: This axiom is based on some basic princi-
pals in science like Principle of minimum energy, Prin-
ciple of least action and Occam’s razor. Given that
other things are equal (such as influence and stabil-
ity), the elite size will tend to be as small as possible.
In social terms this can be motivated by the idea that
if the elite holds a given revenue or power, it will at-
tempt to split it between as few members as possible.
2While traditional research on social networks assumed that
m = Θ(n), more recent models and observations[22, 26]
show that m = ω(n), so m and n might differ in the or-
der of magnitude.
4. Density. The elite is dense∑
v∈E
di(v) ≥ c3 ·
(
|E|
2
)
(3)
for 0 < c3 < 1.
Motivation: The goal of the density property is to cap-
ture the idea that the elite is a social “clique” where
“everyone knows everyone.” The density property holds
when each member of the elite knows (on average) a
constant fraction of the elite members.
Based on these axioms, we can infer the size of the elite |E|.
First we show a lower bound.
Claim 3.1. If the elite satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 the size
of the elite is: |E| = Ω(√m).
Proof. First note that |E|2 >∑v∈E di(v). Using Eq. (1)
and (2) we get |E|2 > ∑v∈E di ≥ c1 · c2 · m which implies
|E| ≥ Ω(√m).
It is important to note that Axioms 1 and 2 alone do
not guarantee a small elite. Take for example a linear size
elite, i.e., |E| = Θ(m), of constant degree, e.g., a constant
degree expander [12]. If additionally each member of the
elite is connected to a constant number of nodes outside of
the elite, the resulting elite is both stable and influential. In
order to derive a small elite size, we must assume additional
axiom(s). We next show that assuming either Axiom 3 or 4
enables us to conclude an elite size in the order of
√
m.
Theorem 3.2. If the elite satisfies Axioms 1, 2 and 3 ,the
size of the elite is: |E| = Θ(√m) and the elite is dense.
Proof. The upper bound of |E| = O(√m) follows di-
rectly from Claim 3.1 and Axiom 3. Now assume the elite
is not dense. Then
∑
v∈E di = o(|E|2) = o(m). But this
contradicts
∑
v∈E di ≥ c1 · c2 · m; thus, the elite must be
dense.
Theorem 3.3. If the elite satisfies Axioms 1, 2 and 4,
then the size of the elite is: |E| = Θ(√m) and the elite is
compact.
Proof. As before, |E|2 >∑v∈E di(v) and using Eq. (1),
(2) and (3), we get |E|2 > c′ ·m ≥ c′′ · |E|2 for some constants
c′, c′′. Hence, it must hold that |E| = Θ(√m) which means
the elite is compact (i.e., of minimum possible size when
assuming Axiom 1 and 2 ).
An important note is in place: the Axioms and results
above hold for undirected networks only. For directed
networks like Twitter, a more general treatment is needed
and we leave this for future work.
In context of the above results, we would like to men-
tion the pioneering work of Linial et. al. [28] and Peleg [35]
where a notion related to elites is discussed, namely coali-
tions. Coalitions are subsets of nodes that dominate neigh-
borhood majority votings, they are also called monopolies.
Among the results regarding monopolies are lower bounds
for the size of these coalitions, namely Ω(
√
m) nodes are nec-
essary to control the outcome of all neighborhood majority
votings of general graphs and the number of edges within
the monopoly has to be in the order of m. Interestingly, we
use a different perspective, but our Axioms 1 and 2 lead to
the same result for a powerful elite.
Data n m
√
m-rich-club Influence - c1 Stability - c2 Density - c3
Youtube 1138500 2989945 1729 35.60% 7.90% 5.70%
Facebook 63732 817031 903 19.30% 31.90% 12.40%
Livejournal 5204177 49163589 7011 9.50% 20.30% 3.90%
Orkut 3072442 117174174 10824 10.20% 26.20% 5.40%
Flickr 2302926 22830535 4778 34.80% 39.60% 27.50%
AuthorCitations 85055 1234030 1110 31.80% 24.40% 15.60%
Wikipedia 1870710 36473378 6039 41.80% 6.00% 5.00%
AS 33560 75621 274 65.30% 16.80% 22.20%
Average 31.04% 21.64% 12.21%
STD 18.37% 11.43% 8.90%
ER Model 1000000 9974503 3158 1.10% 0.50% 0.00%
BA Model 1000000 9973255 3158 11.20% 5.30% 1.20%
Affiliation Model 1000000 32092651 5665 11.60% 220.50% 51.30%
Table 1: Basic properties of the examined networks and models (# of nodes, # of edges) and the Axiom
constants c1, c2, c3 when the elite is the
√
m-rich-club. The average and standard deviation pertain to the real
networks only. A gray cell indicates a large deviation of the model from the average of the real data.
In the next section we present measurements to support
our claim that the elite size in social networks is of size
Θ(
√
m). We show that for existing networks a rich-club
of size Θ(
√
m) is both stable and influential, where this is
not the case for standard models like the BA and Affiliation
model. As discussed earlier we will focus on the rich-club
of different sizes as an approximation for the elite of the
network.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We studied a variety of parameters for rich-clubs of grow-
ing size for nine real networks and three theoretical models
(Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) model, Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model and
the Affiliation model). We paid most attention to k-rich-
clubs for k in the order of
√
m to corroborate our hypothe-
sis that rich-clubs around this size satisfy our axioms. First
we examined the constants c1, c2, c3 relevant to our axioms
properties of influence, stability and density, and then other
relevant properties.
4.1 Axiom constants - c1, c2, c3
Table 1 gives a summary on basic properties of the net-
works under scrutiny such as the number of nodes and edges
(n and m respectively) and the influence, stability and den-
sity constants (c1, c2, c3, respectively) for the
√
m-rich-club
of each network. Gray cells indicate a large deviation by a
model. i) Influence - the influence constant fluctuates be-
tween 9%− 66% in the real networks with high variance, c1
of the BA and Affiliation models both fall in this range, but
clearly (and intuitively) in the ER model, the
√
m-rich-club
is not influential enough. ii) Stability - All the constants
for the real networks are below one as expected. For the
Affiliation model c2 > 2, (220%), which contradicts our Ax-
iom. iii) Density - Real networks show a density constant
between 4% and 28%, while ER and BA are more sparse
and the Affiliation model is more dense. We discuss these
findings in more detail later.
We now take a broader view of the results and check the
above constants for an increasing size of k-rich-club from
k = 1 to k = n. In order to compare networks of different
sizes, we used plots where the x axis (the rich-club size, k)
is normalized to [0, 1]. To focus on small k-rich-clubs, the
x-axis describes the rich-club size for growing roots of the
network size n, i.e., at x ∈ [0, 1] the measurement point for
the nx-rich-club, in particular at x = 0.5 we have the values
for the
√
n-rich-club. We emphasize the size of the
√
m-rich-
club by adding a large dot at its location which differs for
each network. In other figures (usually in a smaller size) we
present the result on a linear x-axis, where k = nx which
demonstrates that interesting phenomena occur for a very
small k compared to the network size (i.e., in the order of√
m).
Fig. 2 (A), (B) and (C) presents the results for influence,
stability and density of growing rich-clubs, respectively. Re-
garding influence - c1, we observe some similar character-
istics for all networks: i) influence increases monotonically
until the maximum influence which is achieved at a rich-
club size much larger than
√
m. ii) the constant c1 is bound
away from 0 at
√
m (except in the ER model). Moreover,
influence in most real networks is larger than in the models
for low order k. Two extremes cases are the AS (Internet
routers) network and Twitter. In particular Twitter is a di-
rected network where the k-rich-club seems to have a much
larger (directed) influence. Since we have data of Twitter
only for a k-rich-club up to k =
√
n, not the whole scale is
presented for this network.
For the stability constant c2 we also observe similar behav-
ior among the networks: stability monotonically increases
with the rich-club size. Except for Twitter and the ER
model, the constant is clearly bounded away from 0 for
√
m-
rich-club.
Recall that our axiom results about the constants hold
(and are well-defined) for the undirected case only, whereas
Twitter is a highly asymmetric directed network. As noted
when discussing Table 1, c2 of the Affiliation model exceeds
1 for the
√
m-rich-club (and much earlier), which contradicts
the second axiom.
An important observation is that to increase both influ-
ence and stability, a larger k-rich-club is better. In contrast
this is not the case with density. The density of the k-rich-
club exhibits the opposite behavior (common to all networks,
but the ER model): the maximum density is achieved at a
rich-club size significantly smaller than
√
n, and from there
on the density decreases monotonically (except for the Af-
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Figure 2: Three graphs that show the values for
influence, stability and density from the axioms on
nine real networks (solid lines) and three models
(dashed lines) for nx-rich-clubs. (A) the influence
constant - c1, (B) the stability constant - c2 and (C)
the density constant - c3. The dots indicate where
the
√
m-rich-club is located, and at x = 0.5 the value
for the
√
n-rich-club is depicted. The small figures
are the same but with a linear scale, i.e., k = nx.
filiation model). So for the k-rich-club to be denser, it must
be smaller, while to be influential and stable its size needs
to be larger.
We conjecture that these conflicting forces determine the
“right”size of the elite. The above empirical results (strength-
ened by the axioms) indicate that the balance between these
forces, or the equilibrium, is achieved when the rich-club is
in the order of
√
m. The graphs generated by the three theo-
retical models do not exhibit all of the properties (influence,
stability and density) in the right scales as shown by the real
networks.
To make the statements about the models more formal,
we establish the following.
Proposition 4.1 (ER model rich-club density).
The expected number of edges in the k-rich-club of a ER
graph is o(k2) for p = o(1) and large enough k.
It is also not hard to show that the BA model does not
fulfill the density requirement.
Theorem 4.2 (BA model rich-club density).
The expected number of edges in the k-rich-club of a Barabasi-
Albert graph is linear, i.e., O(k).
Proof. No matter which nodes belong to the k-rich-club,
each node has m out-going edges in the BA model. Hence
the total number of edges within the rich-club cannot exceed
2k ·m. As a consequence, the rich-club is not dense if k is
not in the same order of magnitude as m.
A more challenging task from a theoretical point is to
prove that the Affiliation model does not capture the prop-
erties of the rich-club of complex systems or social networks.
We leave this as a conjecture in this work and provide more
empirical evidence in the next section.
4.2 Maximum Sociability
Another measure for the structure and connectivity of the
k-rich-club is the sociability. The sociability of a graph is
its normalized average degree, i.e., for k-rich-club with mk
edges among the rich-club members this value is
mk/k
max1≤k′≤nm′k/k′
.
For a graph of growing size the maximum sociability cap-
tures the size of the network at which its members are, on
average, most socially involved (or influenced) in the com-
munity. As mentioned earlier the average degree of the BA
model is the same for any k-rich-club and therefore its socia-
bility level is more or less constant after 5% of the network
size. In contrast, real social networks are significantly differ-
ent with the maximum sociability achieved at a k-rich-club
of size around n0.6. This can be seen in Fig. 3, where the
figure shows that the maximum is achieved at a small scale
k-rich-club. Interestingly, all real social networks have a sin-
gle peak for the maximum, this may indicate that this point
is a good candidate to define the ”right” size of the rich-club.
An exception to this rule is the Wikipedia graph with two
maxima. When examining Fig. 3, we notice that the max-
ima occur before or after k =
√
m in some networks. One
possible explanation is that our data sets are not complete,
i.e. some nodes and edges are missing; another is that these
networks are not in a balanced state, i.e., the elite will grow
or shrink until an equilibrium is reached.
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Figure 3: Maximum Sociability: This graph depicts
the number of rich-club edges divided by the number
of rich-club nodes with the maximum normalized to
one. For a k-rich-club with mk edges, this value is
mk/k
max1≤k′≤nm′k/k′
. This ratio is equal to the average
degree of the rich-club nodes.
4.3 Elite Connectivity
In social networks, the largest connected component (LCC)
typically covers almost all nodes of the network. However,
this does not imply that for any graph with a large LCC, it
must hold that the LCC of the k-rich-club contains almost
all k nodes. E.g., we found when analyzing the size of the
LCC of the
√
m-rich-club reveals that almost all nodes in
the rich-club of the social networks belong to the LCC. The
same holds for the BA and Affiliation model. In the ER
graph, however, most rich-club nodes do not have any edges
to other rich-club nodes; hence, the rich-club is split into
many separate components, most of them consisting of one
node only.
data
√
m-rich-club # comp LCC
YouTube 1729 9 1721
Facebook 903 1 903
LiveJournal 7011 16 6978
Orkut 10824 13 10812
Flickr 4778 1 4778
Author Citations 1110 1 1110
Wikipedia 6039 2 6038
AS 274 4 271
ER 3158 2888 3
BA 3158 1 3158
Affiliation 5665 1 5665
Table 2: Connectivity table of
√
m-rich-club. This
table summarizes the number of connected compo-
nents the
√
m-rich-club and the size of its largest
connected component (LCC).
4.4 Symmetry
In some networks the existence of an edge describes a re-
ciprocal, symmetric relation between the two nodes involved
(undirected network), whereas in other networks an edge
from node a to node b (directed network) means that a has
a certain relationship with b but not necessarily the other
way around. Classically, sociologists make a distinction be-
tween directed networks and undirected networks when ana-
lyzing them. E.g., the first question of a decision tree for the
analysis of cohesive subgroups on page 78 of [39] is “Is the
network directed?” The mathematical tools that are used
differ depending on the answer, e.g., the notion of prestige
(in-degree) does only apply to directed networks. On the
other hand, in undirected graphs, degree centrality is used
(see [38], Chapter 5). Clearly the directed graph model con-
tains more information than its equivalent undirected ver-
sion. However, in many networks it is impossible or diffi-
cult to derive who initiated a relationship and/or what the
direction of an edge is. For directed networks a natural
question is whether the rich-club of the network is more
symmetric than the rest of the network. Of our datasets
the networks Wikipedia, Flickr, YouTube, Twitter and ER
graph are directed. The average symmetric degree in the
rich-club has a unique maximum in all three real networks.
The maximum “ordinary” average degree of the rich-club is
reached slightly after the maximum of the symmetric rich-
club degree. Furthermore, it holds that the rich-club of the
networks is more symmetric: the ratio between symmetric
edges and all edges in the k-rich-club starts at almost 1 for
k = 2 and then decreases rather quickly until reaching al-
most zero when k approaches n. At around the maximum
sociability (k ≈ √n) the symmetric edges are still a signifi-
cant fraction of all edges. In the ER graph model there are
no symmetric edges which is not surprising for the chosen
edge probability. Since the BA model and the Affiliation
model are undirected, they cannot help to explain or model
the high symmetry within the rich-club.
In addition we counted the number of symmetric edges in
the
√
n-rich-club of Twitter. In the following table we can
see that 89% of the edges in the Twitter
√
n-rich-club are
reciprocal, while in the whole Twitter network 22.1% of all
edges are reciprocal [21].
mrc total min max median avg
directed 5,537,573 0 3,778 656 852.07
reciprocal 4,952,210 0 3,238 512 762.00
When considering Twitter we notice that the
√
n-rich-club
features especially high symmetry. One possible explanation
for this is that the rich-club of Twitter is much larger than
in the other networks and that this increases the social pres-
sure on each of its members to increase the symmetry. An-
other explanation is that for Twitter many tools exist that
help Twitter users to organize their tweets, followers and
the users they are following. Among other features, some
of these tools offer the functionality to add a new follower
to the list of people they are following. Presumably many
of the high degree Twitter users apply such a software and
“follow back” their followers automatically. In order to find
out if one of these theses is true, it is necessary to scrutinize
data of other large networks and observe how the symmetry
percentage changes with growing network size.
5. RELATEDWORK
One of the first papers about the fact that the highest
degree nodes are well connected examined the Autonomous
Systems network [42] and coined the term rich-club coeffi-
cient for the ratio comparing the number of edges between
nodes of degree greater than k to the possible number of
edges between these nodes. Colizza et al. [6] refined this
notion to account for the fact that higher degree nodes have
a higher probability to share an edge than lower degree ver-
tices. They suggest to use baseline networks to avoid a false
identification of a rich-club. More precisely they propose
to use the rich-club coefficient of random uncorrelated net-
works and/or the rich-club coefficient of network derived by
random rewiring of edges, while maintaining the degree dis-
tribution of the network. Weighted versions of the rich-club
coefficient have been studied in [33, 36, 43] The question
how the rich-club phenomenon manifests across hierarchies
is studied in [29].
As identifying the most influential nodes in a network is
crucial to understand its members behaviour, many other
articles considered a variety of notions related to the elite
and/or the rich-club. Mislove et al. [31] defined the core of
a network to be any (minimal) set of nodes that satisfies
two properties: First, the core must be necessary for the
connectivity of the network (i.e., removing the core breaks
the remainder of the nodes into many small, disconnected
clusters). Second, the core must be strongly connected with
a relatively small diameter. As a consequence, a core is a
small group of well-connected group of nodes that is neces-
sary to keep the remainder of the network connected. Mis-
love et al. used an approximation technique previously used
in Web graph analysis, removing increasing numbers of the
highest degree nodes and analyzed the connectivity of the
remaining graph. The core is thus the largest remaining
strongly connected component. They observed that within
these cores the path lengths increase with the size of the
core when progressively including nodes ordered inversely
by their degree. The graphs they studied in [31] have a
densely connected core comprising of between 1% and 10%
of the highest degree nodes, such that removing this core
completely disconnects the graph.
Another definition for a core can be found in [4]. Bor-
gatti and Everett measured how close the adjaceny matrix
of a graph is to the block matrix {{1, 1}, {1, 0}}. This cap-
tures the intuitive conception that social networks have a
dense, cohesive core and a sparse, unconnected periphery.
Core/periphery networks revolve around a set of central
nodes which are well-connected with each other, and also
with the periphery. Peripheral nodes, in contrast, are con-
nected to the core, but not to each other. On the other hand,
there are ”clumpy” networks consisting of two or more sub-
groups that are well-connected within each group but weakly
connected across groups – like a collection of islands. When
comparing networks with the same density, core/periphery
networks have shorter average path lengths than clumpy net-
works. In addition to formalizing these intuitions, Borgatti
and Everett devised algorithms for detecting core/periphery
structures, along with statistical tests for testing a priori hy-
potheses [5].
The nestedness of a network represents the likelihood of
a node to be connected to the neighbors of higher degree
nodes. When examining this property, block modeling of
adjacency matrices arranged by the degree of the nodes is
also used. E.g., Lee et al [23] studied such block diagrams
for complex network models, and defined a simple nestedness
measure for unipartite and bipartite networks to capture the
degree to which different groups in networks interact.
Apart from analyzing the most influential nodes, many
articles have studied a wide range of properties of social
networks. E.g., the networks created by YouTube, Flickr,
Facebook, Wikipedia and LiveJournal have been analyzed
in depth in [31, 30, 37]. Twitter has been studied for its ap-
plicability to spot trends, homophily and rumour spreading
[21, 14]. In addition there is a large body of papers studying
the evolution of social networks [1, 24, 19, 37], information
dissemination and path lengths [1, 15, 25, 10], and commu-
nity structure [27], to name but a few examples.
6. DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In order to make a step forward towards finding the “cor-
rect” size of the rich-club, we used rich-club expansion to
determine a subset which exhibits significant structural dif-
ference and influence to the rest of the network. This is
closely related to the question of finding the elite of a com-
plex network. Based on three axioms and on measurements
performed on nine real-world networks, we conclude that
the elite of a network consists of around
√
m nodes and the√
m-rich-club serves as a good approximation for the elite.
Our results do not only advance the theoretical under-
standing of the elite of social structures, but may also help
to organise institutions better or to identify sources of power
in social networks.
Reinforcing the claims of previous work on high degree
nodes, our data analysis shows that many complex networks
have a small subgraph which is much more dense than their
complete network. In addition the structure of the whole
network is influenced by this rich-club. This can be ex-
ploited to find good candidate networks for the problem of
finding the most dense subgraph (a NP-hard problem [17]
on general graphs). One can apply the following procedure:
Sort the nodes according to their degrees and choose the
most dense subgraph among the subgraphs that contain the
first k highest degree nodes. We hope that this heuristic can
be turned into an approximation algorithm once there are
better models that capture rich-club properties of complex
networks.
In addition to the above we provide answers to the central
question of how symmetry is spread among the edges of
directed social networks. We show that edges inside the
rich-club are much more symmetric than random edges that
are not inside the rich-club.
Apart from the size of the elite, an intruiging endeavour
is to study the evolution of the elite. Interesting future re-
search questions include the following: Are there universal
rules for elite dynamics? Are early members more likely to
remain in the elite if the network grows? Are there strategies
for late comers to join the elite?
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